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About Bryan

Resume Pic of Bryan deSilvaMusician & Yin Style Bagua practitioner. Over twenty years of software implementations and upgrades, project management, systems and applications development experience with a current focus on ADP eTime & Kronos Timekeeper/HR systems implementation. 

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BRASSING OUT - Kronos Data Mining

  
  
  
  

Underground mines are required to have a TAG IN/OUT board that miners use to indicate when they go underground and when they leave the mine. Go into the mine, put your tag on the IN side, leave the mine and put your tag on the OUT side. This is known as “BRASSING IN” or “BRASSING OUT” since many mines continue to use brass tags with the miner's name stamped on it. The obvious purpose is to quickly and easily tell who is underground if there is a problem or at the end of the day. (If you think missing your carpool ride home is bad just imagine missing the last elevator out of the mine with no one checking for stragglers)

BRASSBOARD resized 600 

Most boards, like the one above, go one step further and even let you drill down and see what level of the mine each miner is working on. Don’t laugh—this level of ‘data mining’ (pun fully intended) is often more than many companies take advantage of even with their high-tech Kronos clocks and gate security systems. This renders the attendance-wary in many organizations blind to another kind of ‘brassing out’; managers adjusting time-clock punches for chronically late employees. Similar to the “buddy punch”, which is only about 1 day younger than time-clocks themselves, having the “Brass” (i.e. your manager) adjust time-clock entries is more common yet more difficult to track than you might imagine.

Kronos time-clocks and Timekeeper provide a good view of when someone actually punched in, what adjustments were made to the timecard and who, when and why they were done. The “why” is often left to a comment field and its validity rests basically in the trust you have in the manager.  “Long line at time-clock or Employee arrived and started work before punching in” sound reasonable on the face of it. Moreover, unless you actually go looking for these and counting them over time you won’t be able to spot trends easily nor would you have any other information to corroborate or dispute what is in Timekeeper. But what about the security/gate access system?

Although an entirely separate system from the time-clock/keeper system, an organization’s door access data can provide highly relevant commentary when pressed up against Kronos Punch and Adjustment data. Consider one of the reasons mentioned above for adjusting a subordinate’s timecard. Let’s say the employee punched in at 5:28am when they were supposed to be at work at 5am. The rounding rules move the entry to 5:30 but the supervisor moves it back to 5am and indicates that the employee had actually been at work on time.

Now go get the gate entry data for that employee and see that she actually swiped in at the main entrance at 5:15am and her work building at 5:20am. Now the Kronos punch seems a bit more truthful and the supervisor suspect. Total up the difference of all the suspect adjustments and you now have a quantitative amount you have been paying for someone not working—not to mention a clear employee problem with clear evidence to proceed with disciplinary action.

With a little thought and by considering the gate/timeclock layout and data available in your environment it is rather straightforward to create an exception based reporting system with some drill-down capability to support further investigative efforts. For example, if the reason for the rollback adjustment was the ever popular ‘long line at the timeclock’ justification code one could quickly pull up the volume of activity on that clock in the preceding 30 minutes to see if, in fact, it indicated a queue of people.

Several of our clients have asked us for such reporting capability.  While our people are quite adept at pulling the useful data out of the Kronos database we often need to work with someone from the security side to understand and access the gate data it a way that can be correlated. This obviously starts with time synchronization between the two systems but can also involve allowing for variations in campus geography, shift times (eg: crossing days), and what is considered ‘normal’ versus ‘suspect’ conditions.      

Once the criteria and data required is determined, those feeds (and only those feeds) from the security system are extracted for use by our developer. This was accomplished at our last client in one group meeting with the key departments weighing in and a few follow up calls to resolve the technical details. A week later the HR department had the much needed information to pursue their ongoing investigation in the form of a Crystal report that could be exported to Excel. It’s not that this is particularly difficult but, as most of our customers have shared, it takes significant knowledge of the Kronos data side whereas the security system side is relatively simple. With that in mind it is often faster and cheaper for one of our Kronos Reporting people to do the majority of the work rather than their in-house IT developers.     

That’s my blog for the day… time to brass out for lunch! (I will be back at exactly 1pm… really…you can ask my manager ;-P)

Comments

First, I am reminded that I remain astonished that there is no product offering integration available between Access Control and TLM. Simplex used to have that, but they got out of the TLM business. The opportunity for fraud with these systems being uncorrelated is huge. The very first time we did a check of Kronos on premises vs. "out of the building", we were missing people. Enter building, punch in, leave building, sleep in car for 8H. 
 
Second point is that it is impractical to catch every punch edit irregularity-- I approach these things as "how can we catch the supervisor who habitually does this?" The simple number of time card edits can alert us to a front-line manager's largess (or cheating of employees). Also, whereas these edits are likely to be personal favors, check names of edited punches against manager name. Now you have the starting point of what to drill down on.
Posted @ Friday, October 08, 2010 1:01 PM by Kim R Wennerberg
Quite an insightful blog. It nails a major issue of managers moving employee's punches to rounded time (mostly advantageous to employees) just so as to take care of the exceptions in time card. I have seen some managers who think its easy to roll back or forward punches to shift start or end time rather than discipline the employees (sometime this is done so as to avoid confrontation with the employee in resource critical projects/ businesses) 
The trouble is that most of the HR/ Admin/ Senior managers are aware of the practices by their managers but ignore it simply because they have the same line of thought as their managers. 
For other clients, they simply don’t realize this issue till we, the consultants bring it to their attention. After being made aware, some clients simply convene a session between their managers and hand out a verbal warning to desist from such practices; while very few clients go all the way and ask us to collect actual facts/ data to identify the people with irregularities.
Posted @ Monday, October 11, 2010 3:20 AM by Chaman Gupta
So what happens when the employee clocks properly and yet the employee receives more or less than they should. There is one change in Kronos that they do no audits on and is not tracked. Any manager who has access to a timecard can make a change to the time zone for a punch to give the employee more or less time to their desire. I have brought this to Kronos's attention numerous times and still no audits for it.
Posted @ Tuesday, October 12, 2010 8:02 AM by Steve
Kim... I think Chaman, perhaps partially answered your question about better audit capability-- since customers so frequently don't react when there is data to indicate a problem they are even less likely to be asking for this capability. In the case of our last client it was, in fact, HR that had suspected abuse via emps alerting them. Not exactly what I call 'oversight'. We shall see what comes of their response after they have the capability.
Posted @ Wednesday, October 13, 2010 12:52 PM by Jeff Millard
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